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DEVELOPMENTS IN DEFENSE TACTICS
AND TARGET ACTIONS FOR
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
by Patrick C. Sargent
HE USE of a tender offer' to effect the takeover of one corporation
by another has been a popular practice for nearly twenty years.
2
The popularity of this maneuver is readily determinable from the
vast number of tender offers attempted and completed 3 and the volumi-
nous literature on the subject.4 A "raider" corporation might seek to take
1. Federal securities laws do not define the term "tender offer," but the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) recently proposed the following two-tier definition in Ex-
change Release No. 16385, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,374
(1979):
Under the first tier, proposed Rule 14d-l(b)(l)(i), the term "tender offer"
consists of four elements: (1) one or more offers to purchase or solicitations of
offers to sell securities of a single class; (2) during any 45-day period; (3) di-
rected to more than 10 persons; and (4) seeking the acquisition of more than
5% of the class of securities.
Id at 82,603 (footnotes omitted). The second tier defines a tender offer by means of three
conditions: (1) the solicitation must involve a widespread dissemination of the offer, (2) the
price offered must include a premium of 5% or two dollars above the security's current
market price, and (3) the offer must not provide a meaningful opportunity to negotiate price
and terms. Id at 82,604-05. The second tier operates independently of the first such that a
tender offer may be determined according to one although it does not meet the requirement
of the other. For further discussion of aspects of a tender offer, see Einhorn & Blackburn,
The Developing Concept of "Tender Offer" An Analysis of the Judicial and Administrative
Interpretations of the Term, 23 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 379 (1978); Note, Cash Tender Offers.- A
Proposed Definition, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 694 (1979).
2. See P. DAVEY, DEFENSES AGAINST UNNEGOTIATED CASH TENDER OFFERS I (Con-
ference Board Report No. 726, 1977).
3. See P. DAVEY, supra note 2, at 3. See also Vance, Is Your Company a Take-Over
Target?, 47 HARv. Bus. REV., May-June 1969, at 93 (250 tender offers, mergers, raids in
1968); Taylor & Schorr, Government May Abandon Fight to Stem Conglomerate Takeovers,
Wall St. J., Nov. 24, 1980, at 27, col. 4 (conglomerate acquisitions worth $500 million or
more rose from 6 in 1978, to 16 in 1979).
4. For an extensive discussion of books and articles dealing with the topic of tender
offers and takeovers, see Comment, A Review of the Literature on Defensive Tactics to Sur-
prise Cash Tender Offers, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 909 (1980).
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over a "target" corporation 5 for a variety of reasons, including the desire to
strengthen the raider's overall earnings picture, the security of obtaining a
ready supplier of raw materials or goods essential to the raider's productiv-
ity, the development of a full vertical or horizontal product distribution
network, and the financial aspects of securing the excess cash of a highly
liquid target.6
Because a tender offer may take a target corporation by surprise and the
resulting takeover may effect substantial changes in the target corpora-
tion's management, policy, or operations, corporate management must be
concerned with the law regarding takeovers and with the options available
for dealing with hostile takeover attempts. This Comment examines de-
fense tactics and maneuvers frequently employed by corporate manage-
ment both in avoiding potential takeovers and in deflecting takeovers
already in progress. Additionally, recent rules and regulations governing
takeovers promulgated by Congress and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) are reviewed. In discussing the deflection of a take-
over attempt in the context of federal regulation, the tactic of initiating
litigation against the raider inevitably surfaces as an important considera-
tion. Accordingly, this Comment addresses recent developments concern-
ing a target's action against a raider for injunctive relief from continuation
of the tender offer or purchase of target stock under the Williams Act.
7
Section 13(d) of the Act receives particular emphasis because recent fed-
eral court decisions conflict over the issue of target standing to sue under
this section. Beyond the scope of this Comment is corporate manage-
ment's pervasive fiduciary duty to the corporation and its shareholders.
This issue underlies all decisions made by the management and the board
of directors, however, and should not be ignored when considering an-
titakeover strategies.8
5. A "raider" corporation is one that makes an unnegotiated tender offer to wrest con-
trol from an attractive company, the "target."
6. See generally P. DAVEY, supra note 2, at 1-3.
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(f) (1976 & Supp. III 1979) (originally enacted as
Act of July 29, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454). The Williams Act amended the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by providing for full disclosure of corporate equity owner-
ship. For example, § 13(d) requires that any person who acquires more than 5% of the
securities of a public corporation must file an information report within 10 days of such
acquisition with the issuer of the securities, with the exchange where the stock is traded, and
with the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). Similarly, § 14(d) requires that
for a person to make a tender offer, after which such person will become owner of more than
5% of the corporate securities, such person must have filed an information report similar to
the one required in § 13(d) by the date of the tender offer. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d) (1976). The
reports required by each section are Schedules 13D and 14D respectively, and are discussed
generally at notes 116-20 infra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the Williams
Act, see Wander, Selecting Targets and Shaping Strategy in Corporate Take-Overs." Securities
Law Considerations, 24 Sw. L.J. 593, 594-600 (1970).
8. State law regulates the obligations owed by corporate directors to the corporation
and its shareholders except where federal law expressly preempts it. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S.
66, 84 (1975). Typically, state law holds that "corporate officers and directors... owe their
corporation and its minority shareholders a fiduciary obligation of honesty, loyalty, good
faith and fairness." Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 977 (Del. 1977) (citations omit-





Many corporate directors fail to recognize the possibility that a surprise
tender offer to effect a takeover could be made on their corporation.9 Al-
though no foolproof method exists to determine whether a business is a
likely takeover candidate, certain factors indicate substantially greater sus-
ceptibility to a takeover attempt. These factors can be segregated into
financial and nonfinancial categories. The financial factors that appeal to
a raider include a low price/earnings ratio, a low debt/capital ratio, high
liquidity or excessive cash reserves, a strong record of earning stability,
and a book value of the stock greater than its market price. 10 In analyzing
a potential target's attractiveness, the raider may prefer a corporation with
tangible assets such as real estate, machinery, and inventory, although a
corporation with an established name or product and an efficient distribu-
tion channel also is appealing."
While financial factors are of substantial importance in locating a desir-
able target, nonfinancial factors are critical in determining the feasibility of
effecting the takeover. Nonfinancial factors favorable to a takeover in-
clude a broad base of shareholders without strong ties to the corporation, a
weak or unaggressive management, the absence of strong state antitake-
over statutes in the potential target's state of incorporation,' 2 and limited
change Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b), 78n(e) (1976), if the claim involves manipulation
and deception. General fiduciary cases, however, should be decided by state corporate law.
Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309, 313-14 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); see Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977); Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310, 1318
(W.D. Mich. 1978). For a discussion of corporate director responsibility and liability, see
Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979); Weiss, Tender
Offers and Management Responsibility, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 445 (1978); Note, Corporate
Directors' Liabilityfor Resisting a Tender Offer.- Proposed Substantive and Procedural Modifi-
cations of Existing State Fiduciary Standards, 32 VAND. L. REV. 575, 585-86 (1979).
9. See Vance, supra note 3, at 93.
10. A profitable company with low debt clearly presents an attractive investment oppor-
tunity. Some raiders acquire targets with successful profit records to enhance their own
overall profit picture by using equity accounting principles, that is, consolidating the ac-
quired corporation's financial statements into the acquirer's statements once 50% ownership
has been secured. A target with excessive cash reserves or high liquidity, however, may be
sought by a raider that merely wants to soak up these assets to pay off debts, part of which
may have arisen through financing the tender offer, or to finance capital expansion. Fre-
quently this strategy results in the dissolution of the target corporation. See generally Vance,
supra note 3, at 94-95; Comment, supra note 4, at 912-13.
11. Troubh, Characteristics o/Target Companies, 32 Bus. LAW. 1301, 1302 (1977). The
author suggests that a corporation that has recently made large capital expenditures, prefera-
bly cash rather than by debt, is attractive because it will begin to realize profits from those
expenditures over time. Similarly, small energy companies with significant holdings in oil,
gas, and coal reserves are likely targets. Furthermore, he suggests that in the future raiders
will probably seek close-end trusts because these large pools of capital can be liquidated
quickly. Id at 1302-03. A takeover candidate can be characterized simply as a "reasonably
successful, relatively debt-free company where the management holds little stock and does
not appear to be terribly aggressive." Id at 1304.
12. State antitakeover statutes, because they tend to favor target management, have
been scrutinized by judges and legislators, particularly within the last several years. Briefly,
the statutes regulate tender offers and stock trading. A typical statute provides for pre-offer
1981]
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insider control. 13 A loyal shareholder base is less apt to tender its stock
without careful consideration of the offer and its effect on the corporation;
conversely, a weak management is not likely to foster strong shareholder
ties or consider other types of takeover defense preparations.' 4 Although
these factors are not determinative of target candidates, the existence of
one or more should put management on notice of the possibility.
B. Tactics
Advance Preparation Tactics. Advanced preparation is the preferred
means of confronting a surprise tender offer. 15 Numerous methods of
preparation are available to concerned corporate management, but each
has a different degree of success depending on the needs of the target and
the circumstances surrounding the takeover bid. Although defensive prep-
aration may provide a greater chance of success in fending off an unwel-
come raider, management should not be lulled into a false sense of
security. 16
Defense Team. The first step in a sound defense strategy is to develop a
small tactical defense team with the capacity to act at a moment's notice in
response to a takeover bid. 17 The composition of the team is vital to its
effectiveness and, consequently, it should include, at minimum, the corpo-
ration's chief executive and financial officers, legal counsel well versed in
takeovers, investment bankers, and public relations experts. 18 The extent
of the team's effectiveness in addressing the issue of whether to challenge
waiting periods, duration of the offer, and limited disclosure requirements. For a discussion
of recent developments in the state statutes, see notes 52-61 infra and accompanying text.
13. For a general listing of factors indicating takeover susceptibility, see I M. LIPTON &
E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND FREEZEOUTS 9-10 (1978).
14. See Troubh, supra note 11, at 1301-02.
15. Comment, Corporate Defenses to Takeover Bids, 44 TuL. L. REV. 517, 521 (1970).
16. See A. FLEISCHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLANNING 2-3
(1979); M. KATZ & R. LOEB, ACQUISITIONS AND MERGERS: STRATEGY AND TACTICS 221
(1979).
17. See Reuben & Elden, How to be a Target Company, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 423,
427-28 (1978). The authors suggest that some members of the defense team should be as-
sembled during the "digging in" stage in anticipation of a takeover attempt. Other tactical
members may be selected later when the identity of the aggressor is determined. In recogni-
tion of the realities of the marketplace, the authors preface their discussion with the "Cardi-
nal Rule" that "a tender offer should and willprevail at someprice if the aggressor is willing
to pay it." Id at 427 (emphasis in original).
Defense teams are recognized also as essential elements in defending takeover attempts
that already have materialized. See note 64 infra and accompanying text. The time saved
and the efficiency of having specific persons organized before the actual attempt are obvious
advantages of establishing a team in advance.
A tactic that has recently emerged involves the target putting a merger and acquisition
counseling firm on retainer. See Carrington, Kidder Teaches Clients How to Fend Off Take-
over Bids, Wall St. J., Nov. 25, 1980, at 25, col. 4. This enables the target to receive advice
on how to avoid a takeover attempt and what course of action the target should follow once
the bid becomes a reality. Furthermore, the fact of having the advisory service itself could
be an effective defense by indicating to potential raiders that the target is prepared for a
hard-fought battle. Id at 35, col. 1.
18. See Barnhill, The Corporate Raider.- Contesting Proxy Solicitations and Take Over
Offers, 20 Bus. LAW. 763, 769-71 (1965); Comment, supra note 4, at 915-16.
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the tender offer is also dependent upon providing the members with up-
dated materials on industry and stock market activity and takeover law
developments through an efficient communications system. 19 Once the de-
cision to challenge a tender offer has been reached by the target's board of
directors, the team must then implement an effective system of defense. 20
Black Books. Either in conjunction with or in lieu of the defense team,
corporations could develop a "black book" listing various modes of action
and procedures to be implemented if a takeover threat arises. 2I The black
book may contain, for example, a checklist of steps to take immediately
upon learning of the takeover bid, a list of key corporate personnel phone
numbers and addresses, letters with arguments against tender offers to be
sent to shareholders, reference materials, schedules for any SEC filing re-
quirements that may apply, 22 and logistic directions for carrying out the
above.23 Some commentators, however, express concern over the utility of
a black book because the takeover situation rarely can be predicted with
any degree of certainty.24 Thus, while the black book is a recognized tool
in preparing for a potential takeover attempt, it should not be viewed as a
sufficient safeguard against a determined raider.
Shareholder Relations. Critical components in planning defensive strat-
egy include establishing a shareholder relations program and monitoring
stock trading activity.25 Because a target without strong shareholder rela-
tions may be an attractive subject of a takeover attempt,26 fostering close
shareholder ties could be crucial. Periodic newsletters to shareholders,
personal contact with large individual shareholders, and dividend reinvest-
ment programs in which the corporation assumes administrative and bro-
kerage costs are effective methods of establishing such ties. 27 Initially,
however, a detailed analysis of the shareholder composition should be
made, noting such factors as its geographic concentration, the type and size
of holders, their cost basis in the stock, and their possible reactions to a
hostile tender offer.28 Monitoring the appropriate stock exchange for unu-
sual stock activity and noting changes in stock ownership of the corpora-
tion's major shareholders are important because these often give target
19. 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 13, at 264; Reuben & Elden, supra note
17, at 431.
20. For a discussion of the defense team's considerations and operations after the offer
has been made, see notes 62-115 infra and accompanying text.
21. M. KATZ & R. LOEB, supra note 16, at 221.
22. The Williams Act regulates tender offers and other stock acquisitions. Recently
adopted regulations under the Act are discussed at notes 68-77 infra and accompanying text.
23. P. DAVEY, supra note 2, at Il-12.
24. See note 16 supra.
25. M. KATZ & R. LOEB, supra note 16, at 222; Comment, supra note 15, at 521. Once
the offer has been made, a more aggressive shareholder campaign should be waged. See
notes 78-81 infra and accompanying text.
26. See notes 13-14 supra and accompanying text.
27. See Robinson, Strategy to Prevent a Takeover, 32 Bus. LAW. 1361, 1362 (1977).
28. Id at 1361.
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management the first indication that a raider corporation is positioning
itself for a hostile tender offer.29
Corporate Acquisitions. On a larger scale, the target could decide to ac-
quire another corporation as part of its defensive preparation. Federally
regulated businesses, certain foreign corporations, and businesses involved
in activities similar to those of the raider are the primary considerations as
objects of this tactic. Many offerors view the attempted takeover of a regu-
lated company or a company with a regulated subsidiary as problematic 30
because governmental approval generally is required before a federally
regulated business undergoes any significant change in corporate control.3'
Accordingly, due to the delay involved in securing approval and the over-
all bureaucratic red tape, acquisition by a potential target of a federally
regulated business may discourage or delay a planned takeover.32
Similarly, some prospective targets have acquired Canadian businesses
as a preventive measure.33 This tactic can be effective because Canada will
approve a takeover of one of its incorporated businesses only after a dem-
onstration that the takeover is of significant benefit to the country.34 Ini-
tially, of course, the target will face the same difficulties in acquiring the
federally regulated or Canadian corporation that it seeks to impose subse-
quently on a raider corporation.
Following the same rationale, a target candidate could acquire an
outside company in order to raise antitrust problems in the event of an
29. Barnhill, supra note 18, at 765. Although the author recommends a good share-
holder relations program, he cautions against overreliance on it as insurance against a take-
over contest. Id at 764-65.
30. See Brown, Changes in Offeror Strategy in Response to New Laws and Regulations,
28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 843, 873 (1978).
31. Regulated industries that require government approval include radio and television,
insurance, domestic air carriers, defense facilities, and public utilities. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.
§ 310(d) (1976). The statute requires that an application be submitted to the Federal Com-
munications Commission before any change in control of a corporation holding a radio
station license occurs.
32. See P. DAVEY, supra note 2, at 18; A. FLEISCHER, RESPONSES TO TAKEOVER BIDS:
CORPORATE, SEC, TACTICAL, AND FIDUCIARY CONSIDERATIONS, A-6 to -7 (BNA Corpo-
rate Practice Series No. 6, 1978); Hochman & Folger, Deflecting Takeovers. Charter and By-
law Techniques, 34 Bus. LAW. 537, 558 (1979). See also Nathan, Developments in Strategies
and Tactics for Offerors in Merger, Tender Offer and Similar Acquisition Transactions in
TENTH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION 369, 398 (1978). The author cau-
tions, however, that federally regulated targets may not be wholly immune from takeover,
even though activity thus far indicates an extremely favorable position against takeover for
those targets that are federally regulated. Id For a case rejecting a target's claim that the
acquisition by a bidder would violate transfer of control restrictions under § 184 of the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. § 2234 (1976), see Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United
Technologies Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D. Ohio 1977).
33. See A. FLEISCHER, supra note 32, at A-6; 2 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKE-
OVERS AND FREEZEOUTS G-2 (1978) (example of target letter alerting shareholders to the
conflict with Canadian law posed by a takeover); Hochman & Folger, supra note 32, at 558.
34. See Foreign Investment Review Act, 1973 Can. Stat. ch. 46, § 8(1), at 636. The
approval requirement may be temporarily avoided, however, if the offeror applies for ap-
proval upon commencing the tender bid, recognizing that it may be forced to divest itself of
the Canadian subsidiary pending a determination by the Governor in Council. Id
§§ 8(3)(a)-13, at 637-43.
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attempted takeover by a corporate raider that deals in a related or compet-
ing industry.35 The acquisition of a company for this purpose, however, is
generally a post-offer tactic because a potential target rarely knows in ad-
vance the identity of its unwelcome suitor.36 Even without such an acqui-
sition by the target, some proposed takeovers present antitrust
complications between the raider and the target itself. The target could
raise these arguments in court, or the Justice Department or the Federal
Trade Commission could undertake an independent investigation of the
alleged violations.37
Contract Clauses. A maneuver that receives less support than the vari-
ous acquisition alternatives is the insertion in loan agreements and long-
term contracts of clauses that call for termination of the contract or other
severe consequences upon a change in corporate control.38 The lack of
enthusiasm stems from certain risks that may accompany the use of such
clauses. For example, a long-term employment contract for target man-
agement providing for large severance payments upon a change in control
requires proper disclosure in the corporation's proxy statements and must
satisfy a strong corporate purpose because it tends to favor management. 39
Furthermore, debt acceleration clauses in loan agreements may have ques-
tionable enforceability.40 In spite of the skepticism concerning the effec-
tiveness of such clauses, offeror strategists are likely to give them careful
consideration when analyzing potential takeover candidates. 4'
Charter and Bylaw Provisions. Charter and bylaw provisions are effec-
tive devices for either preventing an outright acquisition of the target com-
pany or providing target management with a breathing period to
formulate and effectuate defensive strategy while retaining control.42 One
35. See A. FLEISCHER, supra note 32, at A-7 to -10; 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER,
supra note 13, at 271-72; Comment, supra note 4, at 921.
36. See Comment, supra note 4, at 911. See also notes 92-105 infra and accompanying
text.
37. Kennedy, Tender Moment, 23 Bus. LAW. 1091, 1101 (1968).
38. 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 13, at 272-73; Yoran, Advance Defensive
Tactics Against Takeover Bids, 21 AM. J. COMP. L. 531, 534 (1973).
39. Mishkin & Donovan, Long Range Protective Planning, in TENDER OFFERS, MAK-
ING AND MEETING THEM 313, 339-40 (1979).
40. Id at 340; 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 13, at 273.
41. See Brown, supra note 30, at 872.
42. See Hochman & Folger, supra note 32. The authors analyze available procedures
and amendments from the target management's perspective for retaining control and
preventing the squeezeout of minority shareholders unwilling to tender their shares. The
existence of tough charter and bylaw provisions initially informs a would-be raider that he is
in for a difficult battle. For a further discussion of charter and bylaw provisions, see E.
ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLESTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPO-
RATE CONTROL 193-99 (1977); M. KATZ & R. LOEB, supra note 16, at 222-25; Reuben &
Elden, supra note 17, at 424-25. In Mishkin & Donovan, supra note 39, at 316-34, the au-
thors discuss in detail the classification of directors, limitations on removal of directors,
supermajority vote requirements, fair price for corporate stock provisions, and the authori-
zation of additional stock.
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such control-retaining "shark repellent"4 3 is the staggering of director
terms, a tactic that prolongs the time a raider must wait before securing
control of the target's board of directors."4 The charter or bylaws could
also limit the ability of shareholders to remove directors by requiring a
showing of cause for removal. 45 Additionally, a provision increasing the
amount of authorized stock could enable directors to dilute a raider's
growing control through a planned sale of the unissued stock.46 Finally,
directors could achieve dilution through an employee stock purchase
plan.47 Such a plan would serve not only the dilution goal, but also the
goal of keeping stock in friendly hands. The foregoing provisions, as well
as others, should be secured in the charter or bylaws by requiring a super-
majority vote to pass amendments. 48 Drafters of these provisions, how-
ever, must scrutinize the terms carefully to avoid conflict with state laws
and to avoid provisions that prevent the corporation from later instituting
favorable changes.4 9
Charter and bylaw provisions can go a step further by providing protec-
tion to minority shareholders after a raider has gained control. First, re-
quiring a supermajority vote for the approval of mergers will prevent
control by a majority shareholder to the exclusion of the minorityi 0 Sec-
ondly, fair price clauses can be designed to assure equitable compensation
for a minority shareholder faced with a depressed market or a subvalue
43. "Shark repellent" clauses are aimed at discouraging unwanted suitors, the "sharks,"
from initiating takeover attempts and preventing them from wresting complete control from
the management. But see A. FLEISCHER, supra note 32, at A-3, in which the author notes
that reliance on these clauses may be ill-placed, especially when encountering a determined
bidder.
44. For example, the articles may provide for the election of a classified directorship in
which three of nine directors serve staggered three-year terms, and the election of each class
is held annually. Therefore, assuming a majority shareholder could elect two of the three
directors each year, as many as three annual elections could be required to gain full control
of the board. See Hochman & Folger, supra note 32, at 538.
45. A. FLEISCHER, supra note 32, at A-4; Hochman & Folger, supra note 32, at 541. The
Delaware Code requires a showing of cause for removal only with a classified board of
directors. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(k) (1978).
46. Caution should be exercised, however, because stock issuances by corporate man-
agement that appear to be for the purpose of frustrating a tender offer and that circumvent
shareholder approval have been held invalid. See, e.g., Applied Digital Data Syss., Inc. v.
Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
47. Hochman & Folger, supra note 32, at 547. The establishment by a corporation of an
employee stock trust has been upheld although the corporation's own stock was purchased
for the trust in order to avoid purchase of the stock by an outsider seeking to gain control.
Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972). For general considerations under
stock repurchases by the issuer, see notes 82-85 infra and accompanying text.
48. Supermajority votes require greater than a simple majority; for example, provisions
may call for a shareholder vote of 66-2/3% or 80% or more. See Mullaney, Guarding Against
Takeovers-Defensive Charter Provisions, 25 Bus. LAW. 1441 (1970).
49. P. DAVEY, supra note 2, at 14 (this procedure may prevent desired mergers); A.
FLEISCHER, supra note 32, at A-5 (must consider state blue sky laws, deterrence of favorable
mergers, and fiduciary duties); M. KATZ & R. LOEB, supra note 16, at 223-24 (California and
Wisconsin disfavor these provisions); 1 M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, supra note 13, at 265-
71 (efficacy is questionable; may call attention to company as a target).
50. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
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freezeout following a takeover.5 ' Because such provisions may minimize
the possibility of intimidation of minority shareholders by tender offerors,
target management could realize a benefit in its efforts to retain control.
State Takeover Statutes. Reincorporating the potential target in a state
with a strong antitakeover statute has been a commonly used defense tac-
tic.5 2 Questions, however, have been raised as to the validity of such stat-
utes in light of federal legislation and the commerce clause. In Great
Western United Corp. v. Kidwe1 53 the Fifth Circuit addressed the constitu-
tionality of the Idaho takeover statute54 in light of the Williams Act, which
regulates tender offers on the federal level. The issue arose when Great
Western initiated a tender offer for Sunshine Mining and Metal Company,
located principally in Idaho, and state officials sought to impose Idaho cor-
poration law. Although Great Western had complied with the filing and
disclosure requirements under the Williams Act, compliance with the
Idaho statute would have delayed the tender offer. Consequently, Great
Western brought suit against the Idaho state officials. After a lengthy dis-
cussion of jurisdiction and venue issues,55 the court of appeals affirmed the
district court's decision that the Idaho statute was unconstitutional on two
grounds. First, the court held that the Idaho statute was preempted by the
Williams Act because the state's fiduciary approach to investor protection
was incompatible with the market approach adopted by Congress.5 6 Sec-
ondly, the court held that because the statute put restraints on tender offer-
ors, it unconstitutionally burdened the interstate commerce of security
transactions and, therefore, was invalid under the commerce clause of the
51. Compensation provisions apply a formula for determining a minimum price at
which minority shareholders can be bought out. See E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERL-
STEIN, supra note 42, at 196; Mishkin & Donovan, supra note 39, at 324-26. "Freezeouts"
and "squeezeouts" can occur when the majority shareholder, by virtue of such ownership,
forces a minority shareholder to tender shares at an unfavorable price in order to eliminate
the minority and secure total ownership.
52. See E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 42, at 196-97; 1 J. FLOM,
M. LIPTON & E. STEINBERGER, TAKEOVERS AND TAKEOUTS-TENDER OFFERS AND GOING
PRIVATE 81-93 (1976); Reuben & Elden, supra note 17, at 434-36. State antitakeover statutes
regulate takeovers under state corporation law and typically favor target companies desiring
to resist hostile takeover attempts. See, e.g., IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to -1513 (1980) dis-
cussed at note 54 infra; State Takeover Statutes and New Takeover Strategies-A Panel, 32
Bus. LAW. 1459 (1977); Wilmer & Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover Statutes and
their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1976); Note, Securities Law and the Constitu-
tion.: State Tender Offer Statutes Reconsidered, 88 YALE L.J. 510 (1979).
53. 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W.
United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
54. IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1501 to -1513 (1980). Tender offerors are required to pay state
registration fees. Id. § 30-1508. They also must participate in a hearing on the offer if the
target directors so request. Id § 30-1503(4). The offer, in addition, can be delayed pending
final determination of an administrative or injunctive proceeding brought by a target direc-
tor. Id § 30-1506(5). See Great W. United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256, 1278 (5th Cir.
1978), rev'don other grounds sub nom. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173 (1979).
55. 577 F.2d at 1265-74.
56. Id at 1279-80. The market approach is more neutral because it allows the investor
to make a decision based on persuasive arguments by the offeror and the target. The fiduci-
ary approach, in contrast, allows the target to make the decision for the shareholder. Id
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United States Constitution. 57 The Supreme Court, however, reversed the
decision on venue grounds5" without resolving the constitutional question,
although three Justices in dissent said they would have affirmed the deci-
sion of the court of appeals. 59 Consequently, the question of whether fed-
eral securities law preempts state takeover statutes remains open. While
commentators tend to deride the state antitakeover statutes, preferring in-
stead a single, pervasive federal law,60 case decisions have gone both ways
depending on the degree of interference with federal law. 61
Post-Tender Tactics. Once the bidder has made public his tender offer
proposal, the target still has an opportunity to formulate an adequate re-
sponse. Many of the preventive tactics discussed above are applicable af-
ter the offer materializes. 62 A surprise tender offer generally catches target
management off guard, and any delayed action by the target could prove
futile if, for example, arbitrageurs, having made a market assessment indi-
cating a profitable resale to the raider, purchase large quantities of target
stock.63 Accordingly, the target must react immediately.
Initial Considerations. In order to deal effectively with the takeover bid,
the defense team should immediately analyze the tender offer and recom-
mend a suitable response to the board of directors. 64 The directors, in de-
ciding whether to recommend or oppose the offer, or to hold out for a
higher price,65 should consider the price per share offered, the business
policies and future potential of the target corporation, and the resultant
57. Id at 1286; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
58. Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 443 U.S. 173, 186-87 (1979).
59. Id at 187 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White was joined by Justices Brennan and
Marshall.
60. See Langevoort, State Tender- Offer Legislation: Interests, Effects, and Political Com-
petency, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 213, 257 (1977); Wilner & Landy, supra note 52, at 32; Note,
The Constitutionality of State Takeo Per Statutes: A Response to Great Western, 53 N.Y.U.L.
REV. 872, 940 n.509 (1978).
61. Courts recently have upheld Virginia and Ohio takeover laws as not preempted by
federal law. See Telvest, Inc. v. Bradshaw, 618 F.2d 1029 (4th Cir. 1980); AMCA Int l Corp.
v. Krouse, 482 F. Supp. 929 (S.D. Ohio 1979). The Delaware takeover statute was declared
unconstitutional in Dart Indus. Inc. v. Conrad, 462 F. Supp. I (S.D. Ind. 1978).
62. The time factor will limit the effectiveness of several tactics mentioned, but manage-
ment nonetheless can implement acquisitions to interpose antitrust complications, share-
holder communication programs, or plans to issue additional stock to dilute the raider's
shareholdings.
63. Arbitrageurs are not involved with either the target or raider. They independently
assess risk, reward, and probability in determining whether or not to purchase target stock in
the early stages of a tender offer in hopes of realizing a profit on a subsequent sale to the
raider. See Rubin, Arbitrage, 32 Bus. LAW. 1315, 1315 (1977); Comment, Should Tender
Offer Arbitrage Be Regulated?, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1000, 1005.
64. See notes 17-20 supra and accompanying text. See also M. KATZ & R. LOEB, supra
note 16, at 233. The recommendation stage may be bypassed, however, if the board has
already determined that the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders are served
by retaining the corporation's independence. Again, any such determination must be made
in light of the board's fiduciary obligations to the shareholders and corporation. See note 8
supra.
65. Federal regulations promulgated by the SEC require a response by the target to the
tender offer. See notes 72-73 infra and accompanying text.
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impact on target employees, customers, minority shareholders, and public
and community interests. 66
In addition to the policy and economic factors inherent in the offer itself,
the directors must consider federal regulations. The Williams Act, which
regulates tender offers and certain stock purchases, grants broad authority
to the SEC to promulgate rules and regulations thereunder. 67 The SEC
recently promulgated regulations that affect target defensive maneuvers
substantially. 68 Prior to these new regulations, a tender offeror was forced
to bring suit against a reluctant target in order to obtain shareholder lists
to facilitate distribution of offer materials because the Williams Act did
not expressly require the target to produce these lists.69 Under the new
regulations, however, a corporation that is the subject of a tender offer
must, within three business days of notification of such offer by the bidder,
either mail the tender offer materials directly to the subject corporation's
shareholders7° or send an updated shareholder list directly to the tender
offeror.7' Furthermore, the regulations now require a target corporation to
publish within ten days of notification of the offer whether the target rec-
ommends acceptance or rejection, is neutral toward the offer, or is unable
to take a position with respect to the offer, and state the reasons for which-
ever position it elects. 72 The target corporation also must comply with new
disclosure requirements on Schedule 14D-9, which include information
concerning the existence of any material contracts, agreements, or conflicts
of interest between offeror and target, and any current or proposed negoti-
ations in response to the tender offer.73
Although the foregoing provisions impose a greater burden on the tar-
get, some of the new regulations are advantageous. One regulation, for
example, extends the minimum offering period to twenty business days,
74
which provides target management with more time to develop a response
to the offer. Additionally, in order to promote greater deliberation on the
66. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 8, at 130; Steinbrink, Management's Response to the
Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 882, 898-903 (1978). For cases in which the
court found that the corporation had an obligation to the public, see Herald Co. v. Seawell,
472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972) (corporation engaged in publication of large metropolitan
newspaper); Coalition to Advocate Pub. Util. Responsibility, Inc. v. Engels, 364 F. Supp.
1202 (D. Minn. 1973) (utility corporation providing services to several states).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4) (1976) provides that any solicitation or recommendation to
shareholders concerning a tender offer "shall be made in accordance with such rules and
regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public inter-
est or for the protection of investors."
68. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230, 240 (1980); see H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW SERIES 1980
SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK 180-87 (1980); Note, The Effect of the New SEC Rules on the
Constitutionality of State Takeover Statutes, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 913, 920-25 (1979-1980).
69. See Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Aztec Oil & Gas Co., 406 F. Supp. 910 (N.D. Tex.
1976). The suits were not always successful; courts on occasion have refused to require the
targets to turn over the lists. See A & K R.R. Materials, Inc. v. Green Bay & W.R.R., 437 F.
Supp. 636 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
70. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-5(b) (1980).
71. Id § 240.14d-5(c).
72. Id § 240.14e-2(a).
73. Id § 240.14d-101.
74. Id § 240.14e-l(a).
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part of shareholders, the new regulations permit a tendering shareholder to
withdraw tendered shares during the first fifteen days or following the six-
tieth day after the offer opened.7" Should another bidder commence a
tender offer, the shareholder may withdraw shares tendered to the first bid-
der for up to ten days following the second bidder's announcement if the
shares have not yet been accepted for payment according to the terms of
the first offer.76 Rather than favoring the offeror or target, the claimed
purpose of the new regulations is to protect the interests of shareholders by
striking a balance between the target and the offeror. 77
Shareholder Communications. In the event a decision is made to oppose
the offer, target management, or the defense team, should implement a
plan of defense. Because shareholders are the subject of a tender offer,
such a plan should include an offer rejection campaign to apprise the
shareholders of the disadvantages of tendering their shares of stock.78
Common criticisms of tender offers are that the offering price is inade-
quate, that the future prospects of the business are more promising as an
independent corporation, that brokers receive a substantial commission on
the sale, and that the offeror has engaged in illegal or improper activities.79
Furthermore, the target could inform shareholders that tendering shares
would be a taxable transaction and may result in undesirable tax conse-
quences. 80 The target should avoid being overzealous in condemning the
offer, however, because the management and directors could be liable for
false or misleading statements. 8
Repurchase of Stock by Issuer. In order to prevent the raider from ac-
quiring control, the target could repurchase its own shares on the open
market. The repurchase not only removes available shares from the mar-
ket, but also causes the target stock price to increase, resulting in a greater
acquisition cost for the raider. If the shares are held merely as treasury
stock, however, the target's outstanding stock is decreased and the raider
75. Id. § 240.14d-7(a)(1).
76. Id § 240.14d-7(a)(2).
77. See 44 Fed. Reg. 70,326 (1979).
78. See E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 268-
74 (1973); Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Marketfor Corporate Control, and the
Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEXAS L. REV. 1, 33 (1978).
79. See, e.g., Berman v. Gerber Prods. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978) (al-
leged improper foreign payments on behalf of offeror); A. FLEISCHER, supra note 32, at A-26
to -27, B-1901 to -2201. Recently, in Seagram Company's hostile takeover bid for St. Joe
Minerals Corporation, St. Joe announced a 32% increased estimate of its gold reserves. The
timing of the announcement appeared to be related to the takeover attempt in an effort to
encourage shareholders not to tender their shares. See St. Joe to End or Suspend Suits
Against Seagram, Wall St. J., Mar. 23, 1981, at 3, col. 1.
80. Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incumbent Managements in Contesting Tender
Offers, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1104, 1113-14 (1969). A stock for stock exchange under a "B"
reorganization, however, is not a taxable event. See I.R.C. §§ 354(a), 368(a)(1)(B).
81. See Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED.




must acquire a proportionately less amount to obtain control.8 2 Moreover,
federal regulations require that an issuer file an information statement
with the SEC before purchasing any of its own stock after a tender offer
has been announced.83 The required information includes the amount of
securities to be purchased and from whom, the purpose for the purchase,
the expected disposition of the repurchased shares, and the source of funds
to be used in the purchase. 84 Because stock repurchases could be regarded
as improper manipulation of the market, the issuer should avoid any such
allegations by channeling the repurchased shares for use in valid corporate
programs such as pension or employee stock plans. 85
Defensive Mergers. The defensive merger with a friendly third party or
a "white knight" is another popular tactic. 86 Typically, the purpose in
soliciting such a merger is either to enable the target to continue its opera-
tions in an independent atmosphere or to secure a better offering price
through competing bids. 87 The merger could complement the target's line
of business, present favorable tax advantages to shareholders, or simply
result in a more amicable working relationship between the managements
of the target and the merging corporation. 88
The defensive merger, even when it is designed to thwart a takeover by
an unfriendly bidder, may be one of the target's safest avenues to avoid
takeover while at the same time providing a frustrated bidder or the tar-
get's own shareholders minimal cause for an action against target manage-
ment for improper rejection of the original offer. Two factors support this
theory. First, the white knight generally will offer more favorable terms in
order to secure shareholder approval. Secondly, the shareholder, rather
than target management, will make the ultimate decision regarding both
82. See Note, supra note 80, at 1120. A corporate purchase of its own stock for the
purpose of an employee trust, however, does not produce the antidilutive effect. See note 47
supra and accompanying text.
83. 17 C.F.R. § 240.13e-i (1980). The rules also state that the issuer must have sent the
information required under the rules to its shareholders within the past six months. Id
Should the target announce a tender offer for its own stock, rather than engage in an open
market repurchase, it would then be subject to regulations specifically addressing tender
offers by issuers. See id § 240.13e-4.
84. Id §§ 240.13e-l(a)(l)-(3).
85. Comment, supra note 15, at 526-27; see notes 47-48 supra and accompanying text;
cf. Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964) (use of corporate funds to purchase issuer's
stock from shareholder threatening takeover was justified). See generally Israels, Limitations
on the Corporate Purchase of Its Own Shares, 22 Sw. L.J. 755 (1968).
86. A "white knight" is a company that moves in to thwart takeover efforts by an un-
wanted raider, usually by acquiring the target. P. DAVEY, supra note 2, at 2.
A merger is one of three principal methods of combining corporations and "results in the
surviving corporation acquiring all the assets and assuming all the liabilities of the acquired
corporation by operation of law." H. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 68, at 162. Mergers gener-
ally require stockholder approval and should be distinguished from tender offers, which
involve the "purchase of substantially all the outstanding stock of the corporation." Id at
162-65, 179-98.
87. P. DAVEY, supra note 2, at 22-24; A. FLEISCHER, supra note 32, at A-35 to -36; see
Uttal, Knighthood is Still in Flower at General Signal, FORTUNE, Oct. 6, 1980, at 58.
88. Steinbrink, supra note 66, at 893-95.
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the raider's tender offer and the proposed white knight merger.89 Conse-
quently, the shareholder is not excluded from the decision-making process
and likely will reap an economic benefit from the transaction. 90 Target
management, however, must ensure that it makes no improper or mislead-
ing disclosures to shareholders regarding the proposed merger and the
tender offer in violation of the Williams Act.91
Acquisitions for Antitrust Purposes. Defensive maneuvers by the target
frequently involve the acquisition of a company that would pose antitrust
implications for the raider in the event of takeover.92 For example, should
the target acquire a company that operates in the same industry as that of
the raider, a proposed takeover by the raider might be labeled anticompe-
titive or monopolistic in violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act.93 Acqui-
sitions by the target have been defended successfully against shareholder
allegations of breach of fiduciary duty by directors;94 however, courts tend
to be skeptical of antitrust claims raised by the target, 95 particularly when
it has consummated a hasty acquisition for the sole purpose of fending off
a takeover attempt. 96 Moreover, a raider in some cases may obviate the
antitrust obstacle by agreeing to dispose of the competing line of business
after the takeover. 97 Nonetheless, antitrust acquisitions by the target are
likely to continue as a defense technique because the resulting litigation
allows discovery of information about the offeror that may indicate an-
ticompetitive effects and often causes failure of the offer or at least a valua-
ble delay for the target.98
In contemplation of acquisitions presenting antitrust violations, Con-
gress in 1976 enacted the Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act. 99
89. Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defense Tactics in Tender Offers, 64 CORNELL
L. REV. 901, 932 (1979).
90. The merger, for example, could constitute a tax-free exchange for securities and
normally results in an increase in the value of target stock. Id
91. The Act provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person to make any untrue state-
ment of a material fact or omit to state any material fact. . . in connection with any tender
offer." 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1976); see, e.g., H.K. Porter Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d
421 (1st Cir. 1973).
92. See Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 89, at 936-38.
93. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits the acquisition by one company of another
that would tend to cause a monopoly or lessen competition. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
94. See, e.g., Altman v. Knight, 431 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
95. See Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. United Technologies Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1249 (N.D.
Ohio 1977); Anaconda Co. v. Crane Co., 411 F. Supp. 1210 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
96. See Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,863, at 91,136-37 (C.D. Cal. 1976), in which the court held that
Royal's acquisition for the sole purpose of defeating Monogram's tender offer violated
§ 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
97. See FTC v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 549 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1977); A. FLEISCHER,
supra note 32, at A-8.
98. See Brown, supra note 30, at 854. Antitrust actions by the target have defeated
offers in the past as a result of preliminary injunctions granted by the court. See Pargas, Inc.
v. Empire Gas Corp., 423 F. Supp. 199 (D. Md.), aird, 546 F.2d 25 (4th Cir. 1976); Boyer-
town Burial Casket Co. v. Amedco, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 811 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976). See Antitrust Aspects of Takeovers and Mergers." The Hart
Scott Rodino Antitrust Improvement Act of 1976-A Panel, 32 Bus. LAW. 1517 (1977); Axinn,
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The Act prohibits the acquisition of the securities or assets of a corporation
if, as a result of such acquisition, the acquirer would hold fifteen percent or
more of the issuer's securities unless the acquirer properly files a notifica-
tion of the acquisition with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the
United States Assistant Attorney General. 10 The Act further provides for
a thirty-day waiting period (fifteen days for cash tender offers) after notify-
ing the FTC of the acquisition before any securities may be acquired; 1 1
the FTC and the Assistant Attorney General, however, have discretion to
waive the waiting period,'0 2 or to extend it in order to obtain more infor-
mation concerning the merger. 103 The Act does not delay the commence-
ment of a tender offer, but prolongs its completion because the waiting
period requirement applies to stock acquisitions rather than to the an-
nouncement of the offer. '04 The waiting period, although ostensibly unfa-
vorable to a raider, may give it a time advantage because any subsequent
offeror, particularly a white knight, is subject to the same restrictions if
such offeror and the target fall within the Act's parameters. 0 5 As a corol-
lary, then, the Act could apply likewise to a defensive acquisition made by
the target for the purpose of interposing antitrust complications.
Other Tactics. Commentators recognize a host of other emergency tech-
niques to provide the target candidate with some means of defense. 10 6 For
example, if the target is attractive for its liquidity, the directors could re-
duce excess cash holdings by declaring an increased dividend. The decla-
ration will produce an increase in the stock price and thereby increase the
takeover cost to a bidder. 10 7 Additionally, a higher dividend encourages
shareholders to retain the stock as a profitable long-term investment rather
than tender for an immediate gain. Another alternative is to have key per-
sonnel in the target corporation state their intention to resign upon acquisi-
Fogg & Stoll, Contestsfor Corporate Control Under the New Law of Preacquisition Notica-
tion, 24 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 857 (1979); Brown, supra note 30, at 852-54.
100. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(a)(3)(A) (1976). Alternatively, the Act applies if the aggregate
amount of securities held by the acquirer as a result of the acquisition is in excess of
$15,000,000. Id § 18a(a)(3)(B). The Act applies only when one of the parties has assets or
net sales of at least $10,000,000 and the other party has assets or net sales of at least
$100,000,000. Id §§ 18a(a)(2)(A)-(C); see Brown, supra note 30, at 853.
101. 15 U.S.C. § 18a(b)(l) (1976). In tender offers, the waiting period begins when the
acquiring person properly submits the required information. Id § 18a(e)(2).
102. Id § 18a(b)(2).
103. Id § 18a(e). The extension period is limited to 20 days (10 days in cash offers) and
may be further extended only by a United States district court. Id
104. See Brown, supra note 30, at 853.
105. See Axinn, Fogg & Stoll, supra note 99, at 880; note 100 supra and accompanying
text.
106. See, e.g., P. DAVEY, supra note 2, at 24-25; Comment, supra note 15, at 522-27. But
cf. Vance, supra note 3, at 98 (injunction suits, stock repurchases, and reductions of liquidity
are delaying techniques at most; the best strategy is to avoid becoming vulnerable).
107. A. FLEISCHER, supra note 32, at A-37. Caution should be exercised lest the market
see the anticipated takeover as the cause of the increase in stock and therefore lead investors
and shareholders to deem the takeover beneficial. Id at A-37 n.248; see Note, supra note
80, at 1119-20 (price-raising maneuvers include stock splits, dividend increases, and target
repurchase of its own stock).
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tion of the target by the raider.'0 8 This obviously will have an effect only
when the target relies on those persons for its operations. The target also
may enlist its suppliers, distributors, or customers to intercede on its behalf
in dissuading an undesirable suitor from a takeover attempt. 0 9
Litigation. One of the major defense tactics employed by target man-
agement is litigation.1 0 The target often will seek an injunction against
the offeror from the further purchase of its stock."' Such lawsuits fre-
quently are based on alleged disclosure improprieties under the Williams
Act, "12 or violations of antitrust laws.' '3 The ultimate goal in pursuing
these legal avenues is to have the tender offer declared invalid or with-
drawn by the offeror. A secondary goal is to gain valuable time for devel-
oping other defense tactics.' 14 The realization of either goal will depend
on whether the court, in deciding favorably for the target, grants perma-
nent or merely temporary injunctive relief. Recent federal court decisions,
however, have raised a major problem threatening the effect and availabil-
ity of the target's action for such relief: lack of standing to sue. 1
II. TARGET STANDING TO SUE FOR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF
A. The Williams Act
Congress enacted the Williams Act (the Act) in 1968, amending the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act), primarily to assure adequate
disclosure during the course of tender offers and other major stock transac-
tions. The legislative history of the Act makes this goal clear.
The bill avoids tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of
management or in favor of the person making the takeover bid. It is
designed to require full and fair disclosure for the benefit of investors
108. See A. FLEISCHER, supra note 32, at A-37.
109. Schmults & Kelly, Cash Take-Over Bids-Defense Tactics, 23 Bus. LAW. 115, 127
(1967).
110. See Corenco Corp. v. Schiavone & Sons, 488 F.2d 207 (2d Cir. 1973). See generally
E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 42, at 199; Wachtell, Special Tender
Offer Litigation Tactics, Tender Offer Litigation-A Panel, 32 Bus. LAW. 1433 (1977).
111. A party bringing an action for injunctive relief must show "irreparable harm" by
defendant's actions for the court to sustain it. See Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp., 422
U.S. 49, 50-51 (1975).
112. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d)-(e), 78n(d)-(0 (1976 & Supp. Ill 1979). Section 78m(d)(l)(A)-
(E) of the Act lists information to be filed by a person acquiring more than 5% of the stock of
a corporation and is set out in part at note 117 infra. Omission of material information
violates the antifraud provisions of § 78n(e). Cases involving alleged Williams Act viola-
tions are discussed in Part II of this Comment, text accompanying notes 154-84 infra.
113. See notes 92-105 supra and accompanying text. Litigation could be based on other
grounds as well, for example, the poor quality of the raider's securities. Humana, Inc. v.
American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP, (CCH) 96,286, at
92,823-24 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
114. P. DAVEY, supra note 2, at 22. Recognition of the secondary goal is not a condona-
tion of spurious or vexatious litigation. The target is presumed to have determined a valid
reason for bringing the injunctive action. Otherwise, questions regarding target manage-
ment's fiduciary duties and corporate counsel's professional ethics could be raised, both of
which are beyond the scope of this Comment.
115. See notes 137-50, 172-82 infra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 35
COMMENTS
while at the same time providing the offeror and management equal
opportunity to fairly present their case.
The bill would correct the current gap in our securities laws by
amending the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to provide for full dis-
closure in connection with cash tender offers and other techniques for
accumulating large blocks of equity securities of publicly held compa-
nies. Under this bill, the material facts concerning the identity, back-
ground, and plans of the person or group making a tender offer or
acquiring a substantial amount of securities would be disclosed." 16
The provisions of the Act also require disclosure of the source of funds
used in making the purchase of the securities, the number of shares of
stock beneficially owned by the acquirer, and any arrangements the ac-
quirer has made regarding the stock of the issuing corporation." 17 Under
the pertinent parts of the Act, sections 13(d) and 14(d), an acquirer must
disclose the foregoing information in Schedules 13D and 14D respectively,
to the SEC, to the exchange where the securities are traded, and to the
issuer of the securities (the target)." 8 Although similar, the two sections
differ in important respects. Section 13(d), for example, applies when an
acquirer becomes the beneficial owner of five percent or more of the is-
suer's securities, and requires the filing of the information statement within
ten days after such acquisition.' 9 Section 14(d), on the other hand, ex-
pressly applies to tender offers and requires that disclosure statements,
which are similar to section 13(d) statements, must be on file at the time
the tender offer is made.' 20
Despite extensive disclosure requirements, the Act fails to provide a pri-
116. H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2811, 2813-14.
117. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(l) (Supp. III 1979). This section provides, in part, for the
filing of the following information:
(A) the background, and identity, residence, and citizenship of, and the
nature of such beneficial ownership by, such person and all other persons by
whom or on whose behalf the purchases have been or are to be effected;
(B) the source and amount of the funds or other consideration used or to
be used in making the purchases...
(C) if the purpose of the purchases or prospective purchases is to acquire
control of the business of the issuer of the securities, any plans or proposals
which such persons may have to liquidate such issuer, to sell its assets to or
merge it with any other persons, or to make any other major change in its
business or corporate structure;
(D) the number of shares of such security which are beneficially owned
.. . by (i) such person. . . and
(E) information as to any contracts, arrangements, or understandings with
any person with respect to any securities of the issuer . ...
Id
118. Id §§ 78m(d)(l), 78n(d)(l) (1976). Regulations providing for the filing of Sched-
ules 13D and 14D are located at 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13d-1, 240.14d-3.
119. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. III 1979). See generally Comment, Section 13(d) and
Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 853 (1971).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(1) (1976). The consequence of this difference might be that a
raider could acquire substantial amounts of the target's stock on the open market for 10 days
after reaching the 5% ownership limit, and then announce a tender offer on the tenth day
while simultaneously filing the required statements. If the target has not been monitoring
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vate remedy for violation of its terms. One possible avenue of relief is
section 18(a) of the 1934 Act, which expressly provides a cause of action
for damages against a person who makes a false or misleading statement in
any report filed pursuant to that chapter.12' That section is inadequate to
remedy disclosure violations, however. One reason is that courts do not
uniformly recognize the applicability of section 18 to section 13. The Dis-
trict Court for the Central District of California has stated that "[ilt is not
clear to this court whether or not § 13 reports are within the scope of § 18.
§ 18 refers to requirements of 'this chapter.' § 13 may not be of 'this chap-
ter' as defined by 15 U.S.C. § 78a, et seq. 122 Also, even if section 18(a) is
held to apply to section 13, section 18(a) requires a showing of reliance by
a purchaser or seller of securities on the false or misleading statements and
does not encompass a complete failure to file the statement. 123 Moreover,
section 18(a) involves an action only for damages. Injunctive relief from
the continued purchase of the target's stock is not available. The distinc-
tion between an action for damages and one for injunctive relief is critical
for the purposes of this discussion.124 While the former seeks recovery of
damages sustained, the latter generally is designed to secure full compli-
ance with the disclosure provisions and does not involve money judg-
ments. 125
the trade of its stock for unusual activity, this maneuver could provide the raider with a head
start in addition to its surprise advantage.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 78r (1976).
122. In re Equity Funding Corp. of Am. Sec. Litigation, 416 F. Supp. 161, 190 n. 18 (C.D.
Cal. 1976). But see 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1976), which states: "This chapter may be cited as the
'Securities Exchange Act of 1934.'" (emphasis added).
123. See Stromfeld v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 484 F. Supp. 1264, 1268-69 (S.D.N.Y.
1980) (plaintiffs must allege actual reliance on false or misleading statements; § 18(a) pro-
vides no liability for failure to file); Dewitt v. American Stock Transfer Co., 433 F. Supp.
994, 1004-05 (S.D.N.Y.) (plaintiff had no standing under § 18(a) to sue for defendant's fail-
ure to file), modified, 440 F. Supp. 1084 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). In Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 607
F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980), the court discussed the similarities
between an action under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), and one under
§ 18(a). The court held that although plaintiff's derivative action alleging the filing of false
and misleading statements was subject to § 18(a), he was not precluded from asserting a
cause under § 10(b). 607 F.2d at 556.
124. Several courts have granted injunctive relief to the target when a judgment for dam-
ages would have been improper. See, e.g., GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709, 720 & n.22
(2d Cir. 1971) (issuer has standing to sue for injunctive relief under § 13(d)), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 910 (1972). In W.A. Krueger Co. v. Kirkpatrick, Pettis, Smith, Polian, Inc., 466 F.
Supp. 800 (D. Neb. 1979), the court held that an issuer had standing to obtain injunctive
relief pending proper filing under § 13(d) by stock purchasers. "Restrictions upon the ability
of an issuing corporation to obtain damages flowing from the failure to file a Section 13(d)
document do not extend to prayers for injunctive relief." Id at 803.
125. One commentator has stated:
The implication of a private right of action to seek injunctive relief by target
companies stands on entirely different footing. . . from target company dam-
age suits. . . . [T]he recognition of an implied action for a target company
would serve the important purposes of the Williams Act, by affording an im-
portant mechanism by which the target shareholders are given a fair opportu-
nity to determine whether, and to whom, to tender their shares.
Pitt, Standing to Sue Under the Williams Act After Chris-Craft.- .4 Leaky Ship on Troubled
Waters, 34 Bus. LAW. 117, 187 (1978).
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B. Judicial Interpretations-Implied Remedies
Because Congress did not expressly grant a private remedy under sec-
tions 13 and 14, any right of action must be judicially implied. In J1 Case
Co. v. Borak 126 the United States Supreme Court held that private parties
had a right of action for damages under section 27127 for violation of sec-
tion 14(a) proxy solicitation requirements.'2 8 The Court stated that al-
though the legislative history "makes no specific reference to a private
right of action, among its chief purposes is 'the protection of investors,'
which certainly implies the availability of judicial relief where necessary to
achieve that result."129 The Court focused its holding on the goal of effec-
tuating the congressional purpose, but it did not mention other guidelines
for implying a cause of action.
In Cort v. Ash ' 30 the Court clarified what guidelines it would consider in
determining whether to imply a cause of action when none was expressly
granted. The Court set forth four factors: (1) whether the plaintiff is a
member of the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted; (2)
whether evidence exists of legislative intent to create or deny a private
remedy; (3) whether implication of a private remedy is consistent with the
legislative scheme; and (4) whether the cause of action is one traditionally
relegated to state law. 131 The Court subsequently considered these factors
in Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. 132 in deciding the question of
whether an offeror has a right of action for damages against the target for
violation of the Williams Act. Holding that no such right could be im-
plied, 133 the Court emphasized that the factors merely were relevant' 34 in
implying a right of action. The language suggested that the Court would
not rigidly adhere to the Cori test and that in some cases it could deny a
right of action although the test was met.' 35 Significantly, however, the
holding was restricted to denying an offeror a cause of action for damages
under section 14(e), and the Court expressly refused to address the issue of
a target's standing to sue. 136
126. 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
127. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1976). The section grants exclusive jurisdiction to federal courts
of "violations of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder, and of all suits in
equity and actions at law brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or
the rules and regulations thereunder." Id
128. 377 U.S. at 430-31. Section 14(a) is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
129. 377 U.S. at 432.
130. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). The case dealt with a stockholder action against the corporation
for making allegedly illegal expenditures for advertisements in connection with the 1972
presidential election, in violation of a criminal statute. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 645, § 610,
62 Stat. 723 (repealed 1976). The Court concluded that no federal cause of action could be
implied because the statute was concerned with controlling the corporation rather than pro-
tecting shareholder interests, there was no legislative intent to imply a cause of action, and
the action was one traditionally relegated to state law. 422 U.S. at 77-78.
131. Id at 78.
132. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
133. Id at 42.
134. Id at 37.
135. Pitt, supra note 125, at 145 n.197.
136. 430 U.S. at 42 & n.28.
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Two recent Supreme Court cases further modify the Cori test, indicating
a trend away from freely implying a right of action when none is provided.
In Touche Ross & Co. v. Redinglon 137 the Court held that customers of a
brokerage firm had no private right of action for damages against an ac-
counting firm that audited reports filed by the brokerage firm pursuant to
section 17(a) of the 1934 Act.' 38 Section 17(a) requires brokers and other
regulated businesses to file periodic reports to government agencies,
thereby enabling the agencies to monitor the financial health of the busi-
nesses and take appropriate action for the protection of investors and bro-
ker customers should the threat of insolvency arise. 139 Nonetheless, the
Court refused to imply a private damages action on behalf of the broker's
customers and instead further modified the Cort test:
It is true that in Cort v. Ash, the Court set forth four factors that it
considered "relevant" in determining whether a private remedy is im-
plicit in a statute not expressly providing one. But the Court did not
decide that each of these factors is entitled to equal weight. The cen-
tral inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, either ex-
pressly or by implication, a private cause of action. 140
The Court, in addition, stated it would adhere to a stricter standard for
implying a private cause of action than it had in Borak.14' The Court
admitted acquiescence, however, in lower federal courts' twenty-five-year
acceptance of an implied private action under section 10(b),' 42 a history
absent from section 17(a).143 One possible interpretation of the Court's
statement is that an implied right of action historically recognized by fed-
eral courts will be afforded Supreme Court approval. 144
Six months after Touche Ross the Court again refused to imply a private
action for damages, this time under the Investment Advisers Act.' 45 In
137. 442 U.S. 560 (1979). See generally Comment, An Analytical Framework for Implied
Causes of Action." Section 17 of the Securities Exchange Act and Redington P. Touche Ross &
Co., 59 B.U.L. REV. 157 (1979).
138. 442 U.S. at 571. The Court stated in conclusion: "If there is to be a federal dam-
ages remedy under these circumstances, Congress must provide it." Id at 579. Section
17(a) is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976).
139. The Court, however, cites no direct interest of investors or customers of the brokers
other than through action taken by government agencies. The Williams Act, on the other
hand, was designed specifically for the purpose of full disclosure to shareholders and the
investing public. See notes 116-17 supra and accompanying text. The district court in
Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Indus., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 488, 491 (W.D. Mich. 1980), also
noted this distinction. The Kirsch decision is discussed at notes 158-64 infra and accompa-
nying text.
140. 442 U.S. at 575.
141. Id at 578; see notes 126-29 supra and accompanying text.
142. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
143. 442 U.S. at 577 n.19. The comparison is significant particularly because the Court
cited only one case that recognized an action for damages under § 17(a). Id
144. The disparity between judicial recognition of an implied right under § 10(b) and
§ 17(a) is substantial. The Court clearly does not want to open new avenues for litigation by
implying new private actions. The recognition of a private action under § 13 and § 14 and
the target's standing to bring such an action, however, enjoy a markedly more successful
history than does § 17(a) in the Touche Ross comparison, although not as substantial as that
of § 10(b). See Part II(C) infra.
145. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -21 (1976).
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Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis 146 a shareholder of the peti-
tioner-trust brought a derivative action alleging that the trustees were
guilty of fraud and breach of fiduciary duty under the Act and sought
injunctive relief, rescission of the investment adviser's contract, and an
award of damages. In response to the claim for injunctive relief and rescis-
sion, the Court concluded that "the statutory language itself fairly implies
a right to specific and limited relief in a federal court. By declaring certain
contracts void, § 215 by its terms necessarily contemplates that the issue of
voidness under its criteria may be litigated somewhere."' 47 The Court
viewed the damages claim "quite differently,"' 148 however, and cited its
analysis in Touche Ross to support the denial of an implied action. 149
Again, the Court emphasized as the dispositive issue the question of con-
gressional intent to create a remedy.' 50
Although the Touche Ross and Transamerica decisions can be read as a
retreat from the implication of private actions when not expressly pro-
vided, such a reading without qualification is overly broad. In Touche
Ross the Supreme Court admitted its acquiescence to certain implied
rights.' 5 1 Furthermore, three Justices who sided with the majority in
Touche Ross dissented in Transamerica with a revival of the Cort test.' 52
Consequently, a general restriction on implied actions has not been ap-
plied consistently by the Court. Because of the differing opinions and fac-
tual distinctions in both cases, the close decision in Transamerica could
give hope to the implying of a private remedy under a proper fact situa-
tion, and to deferential treatment of injunctive relief actions over damages
actions. 53
146. 444 U.S. 11 (1979).
147. Id at 18. Section 215, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-15(b) (1976), provides: "Ever
contract made in violation of any provision of this subchapter ... shall be void .
Section 206, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976), proscribes fraudulent activity by invest-
ment advisers. Compare §§ 13(d) and 14(d), which do not declare any contract void, but
require disclosure for the protection of shareholders and the investing public.
148. 444 U.S. at 19. The damages claim was brought under § 206, which proscribes
fraudulent activity; the dissent considered the section analogous to § 10(b) of the 1934 Act.
Id at 25 n.! (White, J., dissenting).
149. Id at 23-24. The Court, noting that lower federal courts had implied equitable
causes of action in similar circumstances, cited Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946). 444 U.S. at 19. In Kardon, however, the district court not only
implied an action where the statute stated that contracts violating its provisions would be
void, but stated that "such suits would include not only actions for rescission but also for
money damages." 69 F. Supp. at 514. Cf. Abrahamson v. Fleschner, 568 F.2d 862 (2d Cir.
1977) (private right of action for damages may be implied under Investment Adviser's Act),
ceri. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978).
150. 444 U.S. at 24.
151. See notes 142-43 supra and accompanying text.
152. Justices White, Brennan, and Stevens dissented in Transamerica, but sided with Jus-
tice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Touche Ross. Justice Marshall also dissented in Tran-
samerica to make it a 5-4 decision, but was the lone dissenter in Touche Ross.
153. The Court could be willing to grant an implied equitable action, for example, when
the interests of the general public are at issue directly and the possibility of irreparable
injury is present. Such was not the case in Touche Ross. See note 139 supra and accompa-
nying text. A distinction between the treatment of an action for equitable relief and one for
damages can be gleaned from the two cases. The denial of an implied action for damages
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C. Injunctive Relief Under Section 13(d)
Despite the Supreme Court's extensive treatment of implied actions
ranging from Borak through Transamerica, it has never addressed the is-
sue of whether a target has standing to sue for injunctive relief through an
implied right under section 13(d). 154 The Court, however, has considered
the requirements for a suit seeking injunctive relief under the section. In
Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corp. 155 the Court denied injunctive relief to a
target because it failed to make a showing of irreparable harm due to the
offeror's late filing of the Schedule 13D. 15 6 The Court did not rule on
whether the target had an implied action, but stated that neither the statute
nor the legislative history of section 13(d) expressed creation of an action.
Nonetheless, the Court declared that it "ha[s] not hesitated to recognize the
power of federal courts to fashion private remedies for securities laws vio-
lations when to do so is consistent with the legislative scheme and neces-
sary for the protection of investors as a supplement to enforcement by the
Securities and Exchange Commission."'51 7 The Court's failure to decide
specifically the question of an implied action under section 13(d) and its
recent refusals to imply a private action in Touche Ross and Transamerica
have left the lower federal courts in a quandry. Several recent decisions
illustrate this confusion.
In Kirsch Co. v. Bliss & Laughlin Industries, Inc. 158 the District Court of
the Western District of Michigan dealt with both the question of a target's
standing to bring an action under section 13(d) and the requirements for
was rejected in both cases, but the injunctive relief claim was sustained in Transamerica.
Lower federal courts also have recognized this distinction. See note 124 supra.
154. Many of the cases discussing injunctive actions under § 13(d) are analogous to ac-
tions under §§ 14(d)-(e), which specifically address tender offers. Because the latter sections
apply only to tender offers, a target seeking relief must first show that the purchaser has
engaged in a tender offer. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 584 F.2d 1195,
1207 (2d Cir. 1978) (no showing that a tender offer was made). Nevertheless, target actions
under §§ 14(d)-(e) have been successful. See, e.g., Prudent Real Estate Trust v. Johncamp
Realty, Inc., 599 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1979); Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls
Corp., 409 F.2d 937 (2d Cir. 1969). For purposes of this Comment, actions under § 13(d)
will be emphasized because the most recent federal court conflicts evolve around that sec-
tion. Moreover, the cases and discussion under § 13(d) provide a useful comparison for
§§ 14(d)-(e) actions.
155. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
156. Id at 59. For a discussion of the case and various elements of injunction under the
Williams Act, see Porter & Hyland, Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Company and the Williams
Act Injunction, 59 MARQ. L. REV. 743 (1976). The authors note a special distinction in the
granting of injunctive relief in cases where the violation is willful and fraudulent rather than
merely an unintentional oversight, with the former generally meriting permanent relief
while the latter would require only temporary relief. Id at 746, 761, 768-69. Consequently,
targets must realize that the injunction often will afford them only a delay in the takeover
attempt during which they should implement other defenses.
157. 422 U.S. at 62. The SEC's subsequent admissions that it was incapable of ade-
quately enforcing securities laws and that private litigation is a "necessary supplement to
SEC enforcement activity" are consonant with the Rondeau Court's statement and support a
broader delegation of power to lower federal courts to fashion such remedies. See Tran-
samerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 35 (1979) (White, J., dissenting);
Pitt, supra note 125, at 163-64.
158. 495 F. Supp. 488 (W.D. Mich. 1980).
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injunctive relief. Plaintiff Kirsch contended that the defendant had vio-
lated section 13(d) by failing to disclose its true purpose in acquiring
Kirsch stock, thereby misleading the investing public. The court first fo-
cused on Kirsch's standing, stating that the purpose of section 13(d) is to
assure disclosure of information by acquirers so that investors can assess
any changes in corporate control and evaluate the company's worth. 159
The court concluded that because section 13(d) implicitly requires the
filing of truthful statements, "there is no doubt, that Kirsch has standing to
contest violations of § 13(d)" and "[a]ny other result would certainly de-
feat the [statute's] purpose."' 60 Moreover, the court rejected the defend-
ant's contention that the Supreme Court's decisions in Touche Ross and
Transamerica mandated a denial of standing to Kirsch because those cases
involved actions for damages and the statutes in question did not entail a
public interest for full and truthful disclosure.'
6
'
Having determined that Kirsch had a right to sue, the court next stipu-
lated the standards under which a target would be granted injunctive relief
as:
(1) whether the plaintiffs have shown a strong or substantial likeli-
hood or probability of success on the merits;
(2) whether the plaintiffs have shown irreparable injury;
(3) whether the issuance of a preliminary injunction would cause
substantial harm to others; [and]
(4) whether the public interest would be served by issuing a pre-
liminary injunction.' 62
The court, concluding that injunctive relief was proper, specifically found
that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the
merits, and that irreparable harm would occur unless Bliss & Laughlin was
enjoined from further purchase of Kirsch stock pending the filing of a cor-
rected Schedule 13D and notification to Kirsch shareholders of its inten-
tions toward the Kirsch Company.' 63 A key element in satisfying the
irreparable harm requirement was that substantial harm threatened not
159. Id at 491. For the proposition that the main purpose of the Williams Act is protec-
tion of investors' best interests, see H.R. REP. No. 1711, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in
[1968] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2811.
160. 495 F. Supp. at 491-92. The court also noted that the Sixth Circuit had not ad-
dressed the issue. Id at 492.
161. Id at 491.
162. Id at 501 (quoting Mason County Medical Ass'n v. Knebel, 563 F.2d 256, 261 (6th
Cir. 1977)); cf Mulligan, The Second Circuit Review-1975- 76 Term-Foreword" Preliminary
Injunction in the Second Circuit, 43 BROOKLYN L. REV. 831, 836, 839 (1977) (criticizing cases
relying on the first factor and emphasizing that a showing of irreparable harm is the more
critical element). For a discussion of various injunctive remedies and their application
under § 13(d), see Porter & Hyland, supra note 156.
163. 495 F. Supp. at 502. An important factor in determining whether the Schedule 13D
was inaccurate or misleading rested on a test of materiality. The omission or misstatement is
material, according to the court, if a reasonable shareholder would consider the information
significant in making his investment decision. Id at 503. Accord, Seaboard World Airlines,
Inc. v. Tiger Int'l, Inc., 600 F.2d 355, 360 (2d Cir. 1979). Section 13(d) may be violated also
if the Schedule 13D is not filed within the proper time. See Twin Fair, Inc. v. Reger, 394 F.
Supp. 156 (W.D.N.Y. 1975).
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only Kirsch, but also more importantly, the intended benefactors of the
Williams Act, the shareholders and the investing public. 164
The Kirsch court is not alone in recognizing the standing of a target to
sue for injunctive relief. The Fourth Circuit, in Dan River, Inc. v. Unitex
Ltd ,165 granted a target company equitable relief requiring a purchaser to
file an accurate and truthful Schedule 13D. The court proclaimed that
"the sole basis of standing in favor of the corporation itself is to enforce
the statutory mandate to file a Schedule 13D, which is complete, accurate,
truthful, and not misleading."' 166 Dan River had filed for a preliminary
injunction against Unitex, alleging various omissions and misstatements in
the filing of a Schedule 13D by a Unitex subsidiary, and was granted relief
by the district court. The amended filing, however, still contained omis-
sions and contradictions, according to Dan River, but the district court
denied further injunctive relief because the disclosure purpose of the Wil-
liams Act, in the court's view, had been achieved.' 67 The circuit court re-
versed, indicating an obligation on the part of the court to ascertain not
merely whether the disclosure was facially adequate, but also whether it
was accurate and truthful. 168 The decision, although without any discus-
sion of Touche Ross or Transamerica, implicitly supports the Kirsch analy-
sis and emphasizes that the basis for standing lies in the primary purpose
of the Williams Act, to provide full and truthful disclosure to the share-
holders and the investing public.
In addition to the decisions expressly addressing the standing issue,
courts have entertained actions by a target seeking injunctive relief under
the Williams Act in which the target's standing to sue apparently was not
an issue. Both the Second Circuit 69 and the Eighth Circuit 170 recently
164. 495 F. Supp. at 502.
165. 624 F.2d 1216 (4th Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 896, 66 L. Ed. 2d 827 (1981).
166. 624 F.2d at 1225. The court repeated that it was dealing with the right of the corpo-
ration itself to sue and emphasized that "[the] right is limited to equitable relief, compelling
the filing of a full and accurate Schedule 13D.' Id
167. Id at 1222.
168. Id at 1227.
169. Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
97,603, at 98,191 (2d Cir. Aug. 12, 1980). Treadway sued the raider corporation for injunc-
tive relief because of an inaccurate Schedule 13D. The court denied the injunction because
a corrected schedule had been on file for four months, giving Treadway shareholders ample
time to digest the correct information. "Since the informative purpose of § 13(d) had
thereby been fulfilled, there was no risk of irreparable injury and no basis for injunctive
relief." Id at 98,209 (footnote omitted). In Seaboard World Airlines, Inc. v. Tiger Int'l,
Inc., 600 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 1979), the Second Circuit heard a complaint by a target company
alleging misstatements of material facts in a tender offer by defendent in violation of
§§ 14(d)-(e). Standing was not an issue addressed by the court, but the injunction was de-
nied because the misstatement failed to meet the materiality test. Id at 361. See note 163
supra. In an earlier decision, the Second Circuit upheld a temporary injunction against a
tender offeror pending correction of certain financial information and other disclosures in
the offeror's Schedule 14D. Prudent Real Estate Trust v. Johncamp Realty, Inc., 599 F.2d
1140 (2d Cir. 1979).
170. Chromalloy Am. Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 611 F.2d 240 (8th Cir. 1979). Omitting
discussion of the target's standing, the court recognized an action for injunctive relief by a
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have rendered decisions without discussing the target's standing, focusing
instead on whether the remedy of injunction was merited by the facts.
These decisions augment a growing base of case law either implicitly or
explicitly supporting target standing for injunctive relief.' 71
Although substantial authority indicates that standing will be granted a
target corporation under the Williams Act, case authority exists to the con-
trary. Most notably, the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois, in Gateway Industries, Inc. v. Agency Rent A Car,
Inc. , 172 held that a target company did not have standing to sue for injunc-
tive relief under section 13(d) either on its own behalf or for the benefit of
its shareholders. 7 3 Gateway filed suit for injunction alleging that
Agency's Schedule 13D was defective for omitting the company's back-
ground information and the source of funds used to finance the stock
purchase, and for misrepresenting its purpose in acquiring Gateway
shares. Gateway claimed that these omissions and misrepresentations re-
sulted in irreparable harm to Gateway and its shareholders by creating
confusion and uncertainty as to the future control and operation of the
corporation, by precipitating the possible delisting of the corporation from
the New York Stock Exchange, and by forcing shareholders and investors
to make decisions based on inaccurate investment information.' 74
The district court, addressing the question of Gateway's standing to sue,
conceded at the outset that "decisional authority unanimously has upheld
the existence of a private right of action for injunctive relief under section
13(d)."' 175 Nonetheless, the court declined to follow that authority, citing
instead three Supreme Court decisions that restricted the implication of a
private right of action and that employed an analysis of whether Congress
target pending filing of a correctly amended Schedule 13D, but denied further injunction
beyond curing of the schedule's defects. Because the schedule had been corrected, defend-
ant complied with § 13(d) and no relief was necessary.
171. See, e.g., General Aircraft Corp. v. Lampert, 556 F.2d 90 (1st Cir. 1977); GAF
Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972); Bath Indus.,
Inc. v. Blot, 427 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1970); Saunders Leasing Sys., Inc. v. Socitte Holding Gray
D'Albion S.A., [Current Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,881, at 90,447
(N.D. Ala. Jan. 30, 1981); Wellman v. Dickinson, 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); W.A.
Krueger Co. v. Kirkpatrick, Pettis, Smith, Polian, Inc., 466 F. Supp. 800 (D. Neb. 1979). See
also Robinson & Mahoney, Schedule 13D." Wild Card in the Takeover Deck, 27 Bus. LAW.
1107 (1972); Young, Section 13(D)-4 New Element in the Battlesfor Control of Corporate
Managements. The lmplications of G,4F Corporation v. Milstein, 27 Bus. LAW. 1137 (1972).
172. 495 F. Supp. 92 (N.D. III. 1980), appeal dismissed, No. 80-1871 (7th Cir. Aug. I1,
1980). See Huffman, Gateway May Signal Stricter Construction of Securities Laws, Legal
Times Wash., Aug. 25, 1980, at 3, col. 1.
173. 495 F. Supp. at 99-100.
174. Id. at 94-95. The argument that continued purchase of Gateway shares by Agency
would result in delisting was disposed of by the court on the ground that Agency's supple-
mental 13D filing recognized that threat, and also because the alleged harm would continue
to exist even if the Schedule 13D were corrected, so long as Agency continued to acquire
shares. Id at 94 n.2, 99 n.12. This reasoning, however, fails to account for shareholders
who might not tender their shares to Agency upon learning of the potential harm to Gate-
way. Such a factor is clearly within the disclosure and shareholder protection purposes of
the Williams Act.
175. Id at 95 (footnote omitted). The court noted, however, that neither the Supreme
Court nor the Seventh Circuit had dealt with the issue. Id
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intended to create such a remedy. 176 Based upon the lack of express terms
providing for a cause of action within section 13(d), the absence of legisla-
tive history or congressional intent indicating an implied right, and the
provision for investigation of violations by the SEC, the court concluded
that no right of action for injunctive relief could be implied under this
section.177 Two defects in the district court's rationale and reliance on the
Supreme Court decisions surface upon closer analysis. First, the three
Supreme Court cases cited dealt with statutory schemes unrelated to the
Williams Act that did not have as their purpose the assurance of full and
truthful disclosure to the investing public. Secondly, Gateway was seeking
injunctive relief to compel disclosure compliance with section 13(d) while
the cited cases were actions for damages, a distinction the court refused to
accept. 178
176. Id at 96-97. The court cited Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444
U.S. 11 (1979), Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979), and Cannon v. Uni-
versity of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), as representing the Court's development of restric-
tive principles governing implication of private rights of action. Transamerica and Touche
Ross are discussed at notes 137-53 supra and accompanying text. Cannon, though granting
a private remedy in a sex discrimination action, marked a reluctance by the Court to imply
private actions broadly. See Phillips & Miller, The Demise of Implied Rights, 13 REV. SEC.
REG. 887 (1980).
177. 495 F. Supp. at 99-100. Although the court found no legislative history indicating a
right of action, the original Williams Act was introduced with the express concern for pro-
tection of target corporations. See A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD &
COMMODITIES FRAUD 1 6.3(122) (1979).
The court went on to reject Gateway's contention that it could sue on behalf of its share-
holders, and stated that permitting target corporations to maintain injunctive actions could
give them a competitive edge over takeover corporations, thereby destroying the neutrality
of the Williams Act. Id at 101. This analysis fails to consider whether a raider corporation
could sue for injunctive relief in the event a target dispensed misleading or inaccurate infor-
mation to its shareholders during a takeover, and by thus implying a right of action for
targets and raiders alike, retain the balance of neutrality. See Note, Standing Under Section
14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934." May a Tender Offeror Sue for Injunctive Re-
lief?, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 405, 423-24 (1979-1980). See also Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus.,
Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 32 n.21 (1977) (stockholders constitute the "especial class" for which § 14(a)
proxy provisions were enacted).
178. 495 F. Supp. at 96 n.8. The district court's holding effectively denies a target the
opportunity to compel timely compliance by a stock purchaser with the § 13(d) disclosure
requirements, a decision anomalous to the express purposes of the Williams Act. The dis-
trict court in Kirsch, discussed at notes 158-64 supra and accompanying text, refuted the
Gateway analysis on a point-by-point basis and specifically distinguished the Supreme
Court cases on the disclosure and damages considerations. On the difference between dam-
ages actions and injunctive relief actions, see notes 124-25 supra and accompanying text.
The position taken by the Gateway court also was challenged by the District Court for the
Southen District of New York in Kaufman & Broad, Inc. v. Belzberg, [Current Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 97,893, at 90,500 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 1981). The court
reviewed the Touche Ross and Transamerica decisions and stated that "[tihe Supreme Court
apparently has not understood its decisions as overruling GAF, as the Court has recently
denied a petition for certiorari in Unitex Limited v. Dan River, Inc., 49 U.S.L.W. 3488 (Jan.
13, 1981), letting stand a decision in the Fourth Circuit following GAF . I. " d. at 90,504.
GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 910 (1972), ex-
pressly granted standing to a target for § 13(d) actions. Dan River is discussed at notes 165-
68 supra and accompanying text.
In Berman v. Metzger, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,857, at
90,292 (D.D.C. Feb. 9, 1981), the court held that no private right of action for damages
existed under § 13(d), citing Gateway. Id at 90,294. The court noted that some courts had
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In Sta-Rite Industries, Inc. v. Nortek, Inc. 179 the District Court of the
Eastern District of Wisconsin followed the Gateway analysis, stating that
the threshold question was whether Congress intended to create a private
right of action. 180 As in Gateway, the court concluded that only the SEC
had standing to sue for equitable relief under section 13(d). 18' Although
the court recognized that action initiated by the SEC was not the most
expedient avenue for relief, it declined to accept the notion that Congress
would authorize direct access to the courts for corporations or shareholders
concerned with a purchaser's filing of a Schedule 13D.1
82
The Gateway and Sta-Rite decisions, by refusing to imply a cause of
action for targets seeking injunctive relief, are at odds with other recent
federal cases and a recognized history of 13(d) injunctive actions.' 83 Al-
though the opinions posit their holdings on a perceived trend by the
Supreme Court away from implying actions in the absence of express con-
gressional intent, they fail to discern the distinctions in the cases they cite
for support that detract from the strength of a broad restriction on all im-
plied rights. The nature and purposes of the Williams Act weigh more
heavily toward providing the target and shareholders with a direct and
expedient avenue of relief to secure compliance with the Act's disclosure
provisions. Commentators, as well as the SEC, favor such a remedy.
84
III. CONCLUSION
The proliferation of tender offers as a means of corporate acquisition
has spawned various modes of defense utilized by target management to
fend off hostile takeover attempts. A target corporation often can identify
factors indicating its susceptibility to a takeover attempt and, accordingly,
prepare advance defensive strategies. Although such preparation is prefer-
able, other defensive maneuvers are available to a corporation that is
caught off guard by a surprise tender offer. Target management must ana-
lyze these strategies and maneuvers, as differing degrees of success are at-
tributable to them. Moreover, tender offers and certain stock purchases
implied injunctive relief actions, but stated firmly that no action would be implied for dam-
ages, particularly in light of Touche Ross and Transamerica. Id at 90,295-96. The Berman
case arose from an earlier case in which the District of Columbia court granted injunctive
relief upon a demonstration of irreparable harm to target shareholders for defendant's fail-
ure to file a Schedule 13D. Financial Gen. Bankshares, Inc. v. Lance, [1978 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,403, at 93,418 (D.D.C. 1978).
179. 494 F. Supp. 358 (E.D. Wis. 1980).
180. Id at 361.
181. Id at 362-65. Under the court's holding, a target would have to approach the SEC
first with its complaint, and then the SEC could file suit in district court if it deemed the
complaint a valid violation. The delay occasioned by this process could be enough to de-
prive the target of a timely remedy.
182. Id at 363.
183. See note 144 supra.
184. See, e.g., Aranow, Einhorn & Berlstein, Standing to Sue to Challenge Violations of
the Williams Act, 32 Bus. LAW. 1755, 1763 (1977); Pitt, supra note 125, at 187; Porter &
Hyland, note 156 supra; note 157 supra; cf. Note, Private Rights ofActionfor Damages Under
Section 13(d), 32 STAN. L. REv. 581 (1980) (private right of action for damages under 13(d)
should be provided shareholders).
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are federally regulated. Both Congress and the SEC have promulgated a
multitude of rules and regulations that substantially affects the course of
action chosen by the target, as well as by the acquirer of target stock.
The Williams Act, which regulates tender offers and certain stock acqui-
sitions, mandates substantial disclosure by both the target and the stock
acquirer. The Act, however, fails to provide a private judicial remedy by
which a target can secure a stock purchaser's compliance with its terms,
and the Supreme Court has not stated that such a remedy may be implied.
Due to a recent Supreme Court trend toward restraining broad implication
of a private action under various statutes when the statutes do not so pro-
vide, lower federal courts recently have been inconsistent in implying a
private remedy to grant target corporations standing to sue for purchaser
compliance. The purpose of the Williams Act, to assure complete and
truthful disclosure for the protection of shareholders and the investing
public, can best be served by granting target corporations an action for
relief from inadequate or misleading disclosures and from the complete
failure to file required disclosure statements. The SEC's inability to han-
dle the ever-increasing number of violations substantiates the need for a
private remedy. Consequently, either the Supreme Court or Congress
should act to remedy this deficiency and end the confusing and inconsis-
tent federal court interpretations of judicial trends and congressional in-
tent.
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